Dreaming of Credibility

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 ...the only example of a success of "relativistic ideology" is
 general relativity. It was done by the guy who has proposed later 
 a criterion of reality which (if accepted) allows to falsify 
 relativity now.

Your comments are far from accurate.  Successes of the relativity 
principle are very numerous, including the extension of Lorentz 
covariance to ALL physical phenomena (which has been confirmed over 
many orders of magnitude for mechanical as well as electromagnetic
phenomena), the deduction of mass-energy equivalence, Dirac's 
derivations of quantum spin and his prediction of anti-matter, 
and so on.

As for the EPR criterion of "realism", you have consistently mis-
represented it.  Just to remind the reader, here's what EPR defined 
as realism:

 "If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict
  with certainty the value of a physical quantity, then there
  exists an element of physical reality corresponding to that
  quantity."

This is simply an assertion of definite external entities with definite 
properties, independent of our perception of them.  Einstein summed up 
his understanding of "realism" with the rhetorical question "Do you 
really believe the Moon is only there when you look at it?"  In other 
words, the essence of "realism" for Einstein (and for philosophers in 
general) is simply a belief in the external independent existence of 
objects, in contrast to the solipsism of people like Berkeley, who 
believed that nothing exists other than our perceptions.  There is a 
strong element of Berkeley's philosophy in Bohr's thinking - and 
embedded in the traditional Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics - and this is the element that Einstein didn't like.

However, the term "realism" is NOT associated with any specific 
structure of reality.  You seem to believe that "realism" implies 
some specific structure that has been falsified by EPRB experimental 
results, but that is simply not the case.  Consider, for example, the 
twistor space of Roger Penrose - who is certainly a realist if ever 
there was one.  The basic elements of reality from the standpoint of 
twistor theory are null intervals in spacetime (rather than what we 
conventionally view as "points"), carrying the relativity principle 
even further than Einstein did, and arriving at a structure of realism 
in which the meaning of "locality" is also made to conform to the 
relativity principle and Lorentz invariance, such that the apparently 
non-local behavior in EPRB experiments actually turns out to be local, 
properly understood.

Thus, there exist theories consistent with realism, locality AND the 
relativity principle.  Your repeated claims that it is impossible to 
reconcile those things remind me of de Broglie's observation that 
"what is proved by impossibility proofs is lack of imagination".


Albro Swift wrote:
 Incessant citation of one particular source is likely to be
 perceived as evidence of a narrow background and lack of 
 erudition...

Ilja Schmelzer writes: 
 Thank you for this interesting recommendation how to increase
 "credibility" by citing a lot of different sources.

Pertti Lounesto wrote:
 In inflating credibility artificially, people use, depending on
 their character, two opposite schemas...

It's interesting that both you and Ilja interpreted my remarks as 
a suggestion for how to ARTIFICIALLY increase one's credibility.  
Being knowledgeable about the ideas of many different people does 
indeed tend to increase a person's credibility (especially for 
making comparative judgements about the works of others), but it 
need not be "artificial", i.e., the increased credibility may be 
warranted.

Of course, if a man simply falsifies references in an attempt to 
make it APPEAR that he has availed himself of the available 
literature when in fact he hasn't, then it IS artificial (not 
to mention intellectually dishonest).  However, that was not 
the way I hoped my suggestion would be taken.

This reminds me of an old joke:  Two homosexual men are sitting 
on a park bench when an absolutely gorgeous woman walks past.  
One man turns to the other and says "You know, sometimes I wish 
I was a lesbian."


Albro Swift wrote:
 Successes of the relativity principle are very numerous, including
 the extension of Lorentz covariance to ALL physical phenomena,
 the deduction of mass-energy equivalence, Dirac's derivations of
 quantum spin and his prediction of anti-matter, and so on.

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 You mingle "relativistic ideology" with "the relativity principle".
 The last is - in a weaker form as in relativity - present in
 Lorentz-Poincare ether theory too.

No, it is precisely the relativistic *ideology* that led to those
successes, not the bare covariance.  For example, the ideology
of ether drag leads in entirely different directions than does
the ideology of spacetime relativity.  One suggests the equivalence
and transmutability of energy and inertia, the other does not.


Albro Swift wrote:
 As for the EPR criterion of "realism", you have consistently
 mis-represented it...

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I have not mis-represented it, but given a modified version 
 which is IMO not so far enough from this criterion to justify a 
 new notion of "Schmelzer-realism".  The difference is IMO much 
 less than between GR and my ether theory.

No, you've mis-represented it entirely, as explained previously.
Realism is a well established philosophical concept, and it has
nothing in particular to do with schmelzerism.  For example,
the belief that the Earth is flat and the belief that the Earth
is round are both perfectly realistic.  They represent different
realistic structures, but they both are based on the existence of
a definite external structure, independent of our perceptions of
it.  Neither view is more "realist" than the other, they are simply
different realistic beliefs.  Therefore, a believer in Flat Earth
is wrong to equate flat-earthism with realism, just as you are
wrong to equate schmelzerism with realism.

Schmelzerism is the assumption of a SPECIFIC external structure,
and you take it as your basic premise.  From this you "deduce"
that the only possible structure of the world is schmelzeristic,
but that's what you assumed in the first place, except that you
mistakenly labelled it "realism".  Part of the reason you made
the silly mistake of thinking you had performed a non-tautological
deduction is because you conflated the notions of realism and
schmelzerism at the start.  If you had clearly distinguished
between them, you would have seen immediately that your
"deduction" of schmelzerism is really a short circuit.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I have a certain specific axiom, which, in combination with
 relativity and causality has been falsified by EPRB experiments.
 I need a name for this axiom, and I have choosen to name it
 EPR-realism.

You do indeed have a specific set of axioms (which I would call
schmelzerism), and from those axioms you deduce a result that I
would call schmelzerism.  I agree that you need a name for your
axioms.  However, calling them "EPR-realism" is reminiscent of
Popper's observation that the "Holy Roman Empire" wasn't holy,
wasn't Roman, and wasn't an empire.  Similarly, the doctrine of
schmelzerism does not derive from Einstein, Podolsky, or Rosen,
and although it is arguably realistic, it certainly is not realism
per se.  Thus, the name "EPR-realism" is prima facie inappropriate.
Furthermore, calling it "EPR-realism" tends to obscure the fact
that it is essentially nothing but schmelzerism, which is what you
are trying to deduce.  It would greatly enhance the lucidity of
your presentations if you would candidly say "I begin by assuming
schmelzerism.  From this I deduce schmelzerism."


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I do not doubt that other people (like Penrose) have used the 
 notion"realism" to define other interesting but different 
 axiom sets.

No, Penrose is a scientist, and uses the word "realism" in accord
with its accepted definition.  I suggest you do the same.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 A completely different understanding of locality. Should be named
 differently (Penrose-locality vs. usual point-based locality).

No, it's the same understanding of locality, but it's applied to a
different understanding of the realistic structure of the world.
For example, a flat-earth-ist might say that the notion that a
place in the far East being local to a place in the far West
implies a completely different understanding of locality, but he
would be wrong.  The round-earth-ist is using the same meaning of 
locality, but in the context of a different understanding of the 
realistic structure of the world.  Thus they are both prefectly 
realistic, and both use the same notion of locality, but their 
structures are quite different.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 If we define realism and locality in a completely different way.
 That's a tautology.

No, as explained above, the words realism and locality are
being used in their normal senses.  What you meant to say (or,
rather, what you WOULD have meant to say if you were sufficiently
perspicacious) is that there exist conceivable structures of the
world that are realistic, local, and consistent with the relativity 
principle, and if we assume one of those structures we will 
tautologically be consistent with realism, locality, and relativity. 
This is true, and in fact it's an excellent reason for basing a 
physical theory on one of those structures. (Alas, schmelzerism is
not such a structure.)