Exhausted Ether

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 Thus, without positivism no preference for relativity.

Albro Swift writes:
 ... the preference for relativity among scientists is based on
 its unity, coherence, and heuristic power, not on positivism.  (If
 positivism were the governing criterion, one would be forced to 
 reject relativity.)

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I do not think it is meaningful to start a discussion about notions
 like "unity and coherence".  I consider my ether theory as having at
 least the same degree of unity and coherence, thus, this will end up
 in an exchange of belief statements.

Scientists and philosophers have a surprisingly consistent sense
of what constitutes unity and coherence, in spite of the fact that
these notions are to some extent a matter of judgement.  You say
you don't think it's meaningful to start a discussion of the 
philosophical foundations of physical theories by talking about
things like coherence or unity (leaving out heuristic power, for
some reason), but surely those ideas form the basis for all
meaningful discussions of this subject.  The fact that they require 
the exercise of sound judgement (setting aside personal motives, 
self-interest, egotism, etc), doesn't make them any less central.
The object of my remarks was just to point out (yet again) that 
relativity is preferred not on the basis of positivism, but
because of its superior unity, coherence, and heuristic power.
The fact that your judgement on these matters differs from that
of everyone else doesn't invalidate them as legitimate selection
criteria.


Albro Swift writes:
 the equivalence of mass and energy emerges naturally from the 
 principle of relativity...  the equivalence of inertial and 
 gravitational mass...  becomes a powerful principle within 
 the context of the relativity program...

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 The only difference to Lorentz theory is that these identities are
 not considered as being as fundamental as in relativity.

When you acknowledge that "those identities are not as fundamental
as in relativity" you are effectively conceeding the whole point, 
which is that those identities are *heuristically suggested* by the 
relativity principle, but not by the Lorentz/Poincare theory.  
Thus, you are conceeding (without appearing to realize it) that 
relativity is heuristically superior to naive either theories, 
just as Lorentz concluded.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I have no problem to admit the heuristic power of the relativity
 principle. It is part of Lorentz-Poincare ether theory too.

No it isn't.  For example, ether drag does not suggest that energy 
and rest-inertia are transmutable.  The same for the other successes 
of realtivity.  It's possible to FORCE them into a Lorentzian context, 
but the fact that they have to be forced is the whole point.  The 
ether model was useful up to a point, as it assisted in the original 
formulation of electromagnetic phenomena.  However, by the end of 
the nineteenth century its heuristic power had clearly been exhausted.  
A succession of mechanical models for the ether had been proposed 
and discarded, as people struggled with such things as the predictions 
of longitudinal as well as transverse waves.  To get around these 
difficulties, Lorentz was forced to endow the ether with several 
extremely unphysical attributes (e.g., motionless and yet acted 
upon by non-zero net forces), leading him to conclude that "the 
ether is undoubtedly different from all ordinary matter".  

In other words, although the ether started out as a valuable heuristic
device for helping us visualize and formulate the laws of electro-
magnetism, by the end of the nineteenth century our understanding of
electromagnetism had progressed so far that IT was now dictating what
properties the ether must have, i.e., the heuristic had been turned on
its head.  Instead of the hypothetical notion of a corporeal ether
assisting us in visualizing the workings of the electromagnetic field,
people were using the demonstrated workings of the EM field to place
constraints on the properties of the hypothetical ether (and they were
turning out to be very implausible properties).  Hence, Lorentz and
others gradually came to acknowledge that the heuristic value of the
ether had been exhausted.  In contrast, the principle of relativity
arose at this point and provided an incredible new wave of heuristic
power, in its suggestion of things like mass-energy equivalence, and
so on.  Today etherists like yourself use relativity to deduce what
properties the ether must have, just as in Lorentz's time they had
already resorted to using their bare knowledge of EM phenomena to
constrain the ether.  This approach is as pointless today as it was
90 years ago.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 Read Poincare's relativity paper, it contains the whole program.

I have read it.  You are mistaken.  There is a vast literature
on this question.  Aside from Whittaker, all serious scholars
disagree with you.  Of course, this doesn't prove that you (and
Whittaker) are wrong, but it does mean that it's plain silly for
you to state it as a fact.  You should acknowledge that virtually
everyone who has read the relevant papers has reached an opinion
contrary to yours, and offer some substantive reason why all those 
people are wrong and you are right.  Whittaker never defended his 
view, he simply snubbed Einstein without comment.  That is not 
rational discourse.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I don't bother about the originality of Popper's work, IMO his
 methodology is indeed simply the classical Scientific Method.  If 
 IYO "common sense" is a swearword, I do not agree. IMO to explain
 something on the level of common sense shows that you have 
 understood it.

Where did that come from?  Methinks you are rehearsing a different
play.  I have the highest regard both for the scientific method
and for common sense.  (I practice both of them almost every day.)
My point was that you really don't need to cite Popper for common
sense or for the scientific method, because he didn't invent them.

You claim not to care about the appearance of erudition, and yet
your incessant references to Popper for the most trivial of ideas
make it look as though you are motivated precisely by a desire to
give some weight of authority to those ideas, as if you can't defend
them on their own merits.

If you had read more widely, you would be more comfortable with
your sense of what is in common currency and what is "proprietary"
and deserving of an eponymous mention.  Your present proclivity for
referencing Popper borders on the comical.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 We have a proof, which, based on simple axioms, allows to prove
 Bell's inequality. One of the axioms should be false. It seems useful
 to give these axioms simple names. Thus, it doesn't matter if there
 are 1842 different definitions of "realism" available, I bother about
 the one which is part of the proof, which I have named EPR-realism.

I said there are many different *interpretations* of realism, and
you changed that to "definitions".  There is only one definition of 
realism, namely the belief in an ontology of entities with definite 
properties.  The differences in interpretation are really just 
different ideas about how the ontology is constituted.  The thing
you call EPR-realism actually has nothing to do with the "realism 
postulate" appearing in the EPR paper.  You are postulating a 
*specific* realistic ontology, one that happens to be inconsistent 
with locality and the relativity principle.  However, there are 
other equally realistic ontologies that ARE consistent with 
locality and relativity.  Thus, your assertion that Aspect rules 
out a realistic, local, relativistic theory is false.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 A formula is already a theory, no longer a catalog.

No, a formula is not a theory.  LET and SR have the same formulae,
but they are not the same theory.  I'm not surprised to see that
you don't know the difference between a formula and a theory,
because that is essentially your entire problem.  You look at a
set of formulae and think they constitute a theory.  They don't.
What you call the "ideologies" are crucial.


Albro Swift writes:
 Incessant citation of one particular source is likely to be
 perceived as evidence of a narrow background and lack of 
 erudition..

Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 Thank you for this interesting recommendation how to increase
 "credibility" by citing a lot of different sources.

I'm afraid you misunderstood, on more than one level.  First, the 
point of references is not to give a false impression that you know
what you're talking about, but rather to ACTUALLY know what you're
talking about, and to imbue your writing with that knowledge.
That's what I had hoped to encourage.

Second, it was YOU who chose the tactic of supporting your ideas
by reference to authority, as opposed to defending them on their
own merits.  Ideally you should be comfortable enough with your 
command of the subject that you don't need these constant appeals
to authority, but of course that means you will need to learn how
to articulate and defend your own ideas on a substantive level. 
However, in the mean time, if you insist on citing an authority
for every idea you put forward, my suggestion is simply that you
would be better served by citing a different authority from time
to time.  Admittedly in your case this would amount to something
of a deception, but unless you undertake to actually become more 
knowledgeable, I'm afraid you're committed to some degree of 
deception.

By the way, a classic example of a persuasive and compelling 
exposition of a new way of looking at physics is Einstein's EMB
paper, which of course contains not a single reference (and only
one acknowledgement, to his loyal friend M. Besso).  The paper 
succeeded in articulating an idea that was surely unfamiliar to
its readers, and contrary to their preconceptions.  That is a
very difficult thing to do.

Thus, I do not advocate the proliferation of references, but I 
do advocate knowing what you are talking about, and knowing it 
well enough that you can describe it and defend it with minimal 
references to authority (preferably none at all).  HOWEVER, if in 
your present state of knowledge you feel it necessary to cite an 
authority in every 3rd sentence of your prose, then for God's 
sake don't always make it the same authority.  As Popper once 
said to his mother, "ASSUME a virtue if you have it not."


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I'm more bothered about having a self-consistent position. Mingling
 different methodologies is certainly not a consistent position.  Thus,
 I refer to Popper as some sort of consistent introduction into the
 Scientific Method.

I think your emphasis on methodological considerations is misguided 
and misplaced.  My guess is that you've been driven to focus on these 
issues out of frustration over people not embracing your theory.  You 
seek some rigid criterion that will COMPELL people to value your theory, 
whether they like it or not.  That approach is not very robust.  The 
philosophy of science is descriptive, not prescriptive. If your theory 
doesn't persuade on its own, then Popper isn't going to make it 
persuasive.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 I hate politics of citations.  May be your recommendations are 
 indeed useful to increase "reputation" among people who use such 
 citation counting considerations instead of comparing arguments 
 to define the reputation of other people.

It's unfortunate that you regard the acquisition of knowledge as 
nothing more than an empty technique to enhance your reputation.  
My recommendation is to improve your ideas, increase your knowledge, 
avoid naive presumptions in the articulation of your views, and let 
your reputation take care of itself.

By the way, if you read my previous post closely you'll see that I 
was primarily advocating not more references, but LESS POPPER.  In my
opinion, you would do far better to have no references at all than 
to have 1000 references - all to Popper.  Also, while using "politics"
as a swear word, you shouldn't lose sight of the fact that all 
communication is political.


Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
 Thank you for these recommendations, but I doubt that I will 
 use them.

So do I.  In fact, if I'd thought you would use them, I probably 
wouldn't have offerred them.  As Popper once said in very dire 
circumstances, "senza tema d'infamia ti rispondo".